What is Reform UK? Building a communist response

Movements to the right of the political mainstream are once again growing, with Reform UK the latest party to find itself challenging both the major political parties from a position to their right. Victories in the Runcorn and Helsby by-election, and across the country in the local and mayoral elections, have placed Nigel Farage’s party in a position where they can reasonably talk about being the dominant opposition to the Labour government, if not a potential future party of government. As communists, much consideration has to be put into what the nature of Reform is, who it is winning in British society and how we respond to their growth.

What are the origins of Reform UK?

The party began life initially as the Brexit Party, a party hastily set up in late 2018 by ex-UK Independence Party (UKIP) politician Catherine Blaiklock to campaign for the speediest and cleanest exit of the European Union (referred to as a “no-deal Brexit”.) Whilst this was not initially a plan which included Nigel Farage, the ex-UKIP leader was immediately supportive of the formation of the party and quickly invited back in, taking over as leader from Blaiklock a mere 2 months after the party was announced. He also quickly took 60% ownership of the party itself as a private limited company. The Brexit Party existed primarily as a vehicle to push the Conservatives and Labour to the right on the issue of Brexit itself, targeting a large group of traditional voters of both parties who were dissatisfied with the perceived dallying and softening of the plans to leave the EU pursued by Theresa May.

In this the party can only be described as having succeeded. The party rapidly gained support from a wide section of British voters, being the largest single party in the admittedly largely symbolic European elections of 2019, and even briefly leading the polls that summer. It is also likely that the rise of the Brexit party to the right of the Tories will have factored into the decision to make Boris Johnson the Tory leader and Prime Minister, initiating a pivot towards a “hard Brexit” which led to a much more significant rupture from the European Union on all manner of issues. The winter general election of 2019 in the end was somewhat underwhelming for the party, with a huge number of candidates standing down to ensure the landslide victory of the Conservatives.

Inevitably, with Britain leaving the European Union the next year, the Brexit Party was to all intents and purposes no longer of use. The project of Farage’s new party and his previous party UKIP was complete. The pivot and change of name to Reform UK occurred in May 2020, with the purpose of the party initially being to operate in a similar way as it had with Brexit, but instead in relation to the Covid-19 lockdown. Arguing that the country should “learn to live” with coronavirus, this strategy largely did not resonate with the population, with the party rarely polling above single-figure percentage points during the period of lockdown. Farage also briefly left the party in 2021, being replaced as leader by the party chairman Richard Tice. The party then proceeded to oppose the pledge for the UK to become “net zero” on fossil fuel emissions by 2050, with Tice at one stage pledging a referendum on the policy. Again how politically popular this was is dubious. The party instead came to grow due to the issue of immigration, one which was briefly somewhat neutered by the perception that Brexit would lead to a significant cut in migration, but rose again in salience following a rise in net migration to an estimated 906,000 in 2023 and a media-led hysteria about the rise of asylum seekers crossing the British channel in “small boats”.

Having already been successful in exploiting this issue with UKIP in order to drive the Tories into arguing for a referendum on the European Union in the lead up to the 2015 general election, this was home territory for Farage. With this, Reform was again able to begin climbing the polls, reaching 10% in late 2023, and largely remaining at or around that point or higher until the 2024 general election. Prior to the election, the party gained its first MP with the defection of former Tory party chairman Lee Anderson, following a scandal in which the MP for Ashfield suggested that Sadiq Khan and Keir Starmer were controlled by “Islamists”. In the election, the party won 14% of the popular vote and 5 seats, marking the best performance of one of Farage’s parties in a national election, albeit one which came as a slight disappointment given the exit polls had initially projected Reform to get 13 seats. The party also came second in 98 different seats, and at points in the campaign were polling above the floundering Conservatives.

What is Reform UK today?

Since this election, Reform has grown further. The party is now sitting consistently at well over 20% in most polling, and is frequently the largest party with multiple different polling companies following the by-election and local election results. The party has also undergone significant internal changes. Farage relinquished ownership of the party in February 2025. This marked a shift away from the party model he had previously favoured, one in which the Brexit Party and Reform largely served as a giant megaphone for Farage and the rest of the leadership group, with an array of paying supporters with no real voting rights. Instead the party appears to be moving towards a membership model, with the party requiring more active participation from its membership as it seeks to implant itself in the numerous constituencies it had a significant presence in during the 2024 General Election. There are also persistent rumours of Conservative MPs defecting to Reform, in line with the large number of Tory councillors who became Reform candidates prior to the recent general election.

All of this poses a significant challenge to the party, and in particular to Farage, who has from the inception of UKIP had a persistent issue of clashing with those who occupy positions of leadership alongside him. Examples such as UKIP founder Alan Sked and former Labour MP and TV personality Robert Kilroy-Silk are mirrored this year with the sudden suspension and then resignation of Great Yarmouth MP Rupert Lowe in March 2025 on allegations of bullying from the then Reform chairman Zia Yusuf. These claims briefly led to legal action being taken, though the Crown Prosecution Service ruled that there was insufficient evidence to charge Lowe. Yusuf himself has also recently resigned from the party, seemingly over frustration at the new MP for Runcorn and Helsby Sarah Pochin’s call for a ban on the burqa, a piece of clothing covering almost all of the body and face, traditionally associated with Islam. This, along with the Lowe row, has highlighted a divide in the party which could threaten its position before the next general election. Yusuf appeared to represent a wing that looked to pull the party more towards the mainstream, generally attempting to minimise any connection to the far right, or to its political obsessions. This is also twinned with the claims that Yusuf has had a significant influence in setting up much of Reform’s party infrastructure. Lowe, by comparison, frequently called for positions well to the right of the party manifesto, recently endorsing the calls by Pochin to ban the burqa, and calling for significantly ramped up policies on the deportation of “illegal immigrants”. The position of Lowe is, one which will likely win more favour among party activists, while Yusuf likely represents more closely the more cautious views of the general public. How this divide will manifest in the party over the next few years is yet to be seen.

Another factor to consider when investigating the character of Reform UK today is how it raises funds. The party is funded by an array of wealthy individual donors, as well as by its membership. The donors to the party include familiar faces such as the prominent pro-Brexit donors Arron Banks and Crispin Odey, the long-term Tory donor and Pimlico Plumbers owners Charlie Mullins, and Richard Smith, the owner of the building on Tufton Street in London which has long housed many prominent right wing think tanks. A significant percentage of the financing of Reform has also come through the MP for Boston and Skegness, Richard Tice, a property developer. There were also rumours of Elon Musk providing an $100 million donation to Reform, though these appeared to be quashed by Musk’s criticism of Farage in relation to the Rupert Lowe controversy. The party by and large however is funded by a section of smaller, though still immensely wealthy capitalists. It is this section of the capitalist class, those who tend, unlike the wealthiest and most influential of their class, to reach towards a kind of obnoxious libertarian populism, characterised by a hatred of almost any intervention of the British state in the economy, apart from where it underwrites their prosperity.

Politically the party can be characterised as being part of the quite broad and nebulous “populist right” which has gained ground across much of the world in recent years. Existing as a generally sleeker, less overtly reactionary alternative to the far-right of fascist parties and hooligan street movements, the populist right includes parties which have, to some degree, renounced prior fascist politics, such as Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party in France or the Sweden Democrats, or parties which have their roots instead as a right deviation from the mainstream conservative movement, such as the Alternative for Deutschland and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom.

Reform UK is certainly more the latter than the former, consisting of large numbers of ex-Conservative politicians and clearly aiming to draw in the Tory right. The relationship of Reform, and Farage historically, to those to his right has always been more mixed. The party simultaneously inevitably draws in more extreme elements as loyal activists of the party, but this comes with Farage frequently being at pains to condemn those to his right, be they the British National Party and the English Defence League in the 2000s and early 2010s or following his departure, the increasingly right wing UKIP. As to whether this is a fundamental difference between Farage and those further right than him, or an attempt to appear more respectable to mainstream politics is heavily disputed.

What characterises the politics of Reform is generally a mixture of very overt and authoritarian British nationalism on matters of immigration, law and order and education, and small state “libertarian” conservatism on most economic issues. Their 2024 manifesto included as its first policy section its immigration policy, which advocated a large tranche of drastic measures, from the freezing of all “non-essential immigration” to “relieve the pressure on our housing, public services, increase wages and protect our culture, identity and values” to a requirement of five years’ residency and employment for migrants to claim any benefits in the UK. On the economy there was a series of proposed cuts in taxes, government spending and regulations, much of which was clearly focused around the support of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This also ties in to the focus on increased support to the British agriculture and fishing industries.

Along with this are proposals to increase the powers and numbers of the police, and recruit heavily for the armed forces. Alongside this are also barely concealed references to the pet obsessions of the populist right globally. There are, as just two examples, the proposal of “Common Sense Policing not ‘Woke’ Policing” encompassing the scrapping of all “Diversity, Equality and Inclusion” (DEI) roles in the police, or the “Armed Forces Justice Bill” legislation designed to protect soldiers from prosecution for crimes committed during active service. Otherwise, there are calls for a “Patriotic Curriculum in Primary and Secondary Schools”, in which any discussion of British or European imperialism of slavery “must be paired with the teaching of a non-European occurrence of the same to ensure balance”. The manifesto calls to reject the World Economic Forum, World Health Organisation Pandemic Treaty and oppose the creation of a Central Bank Digital Currency, all pet obsessions of the post-Covid right.

The manifesto, while clearly playing to its intended audience, also includes vast amounts of policies concerning issues which are certainly not salient purely to reactionaries. There are policies to address political corruption, the democratic deficit in the First Past the Post voting system and tax avoidance. There is also a set of policies on the NHS which follow a similar line to the one taken during Wes Streeting’s tenure as Health Secretary, namely a support for the use of private healthcare capacity to ease the pressure on the underfunded health service, though this is an issue in which Reform and Farage in particular repeatedly make vague suggestions of more radical reform, if not outright abolition, of the NHS’ status as a free at the point of use service. In addition, since the election the party has clearly attempted to make further inroads with traditional Labour voters, with Farage arguing in recent months for the renationalisation of British steel, along with small but notable gains among the trade union movement. Only a few days ago Farage came out in support of the removal of the 2-child benefit cap, something which previously would have seemed unimaginable when looking at the generally fairly reactionary stance on welfare in the 2024 manifesto. The willingness of Reform to make opportunistic political manoeuvres seems to only be increasing as it appears to move closer to taking significant political power.

Who supports Reform UK and for what reason?

Reform UK has undoubtedly experienced a rise over the last two years, but with which sections of the population, and why? Prior to anything else, it is important to note that Reform presents itself, and is believed by many to be, a vote against the “establishment”, represented generally in the two major political parties. From an Ipsos Mori poll published in March 2025, when asking Reform voters what their top 5 reasons for voting for the party were, 56% said that “they are most likely to provide the UK with the change that it needs”, and 46% said that “they are the most likely to do what they say they will”, in both cases being a far higher percentage in agreement with these statements compared to prospective voters for the other parties. This sentiment in the United Kingdom has now, after years of political chaos and social unrest, unsurprisingly become commonplace, so it gets us no closer to working out the character of the Reform vote.

The Reform vote, in much the same way as its state politics, appears to cut across class interests. For instance, from a YouGov poll conducted in the aftermath of the 2024 General Election, Reform voters were found to be from a fairly broad section of society by a number of measures. On household income, 17% of those with a household income of under £20,000 voted Reform, along with 10% of those with an income of over £70,000. On employment status, Reform consistently won around 15% of voters among the retired, unemployed or working. By the admittedly somewhat vague NRS social class system, Reform received the vote of around 20% of those in the classes C2 (Skilled manual workers), D (Semi-skilled and unskilled workers) and E (State pensioners, casual and lowest grade workers, unemployed with state benefits only). While this system has a tendency to blur important distinctions between a member of the working class, and those who are self-employed, own small businesses etc. this does, in my view, indicate that there is a substantial portion of both the working class, and the small business owning, self-employed middle class voting for Reform.

While much of the research done into Reform’s voter base reflects what you would expect, that the Reform vote skews older, towards white British voters, Christians and a variety of reactionary views on immigration, feminism, conspiratorial thinking and other issues, there are some more peculiar findings. Some research has indicated that a significant section of Reform voters are both younger, and have more positive views on immigration. This suggests both that there is a broader appeal to the populist right than is typically portrayed, and also that there is a section of the British population who are drawn to Reform primarily because of the failings of the 2 major parties, with Reform representing, in their minds, a radically different approach.

While Reform’s politics generally leans into the nostalgic, petty nationalism that is often attractive to a section of the middle classes, it is clear that this is not entirely representative of the Reform vote. It is also clear that a section of the working class is drawn towards the party, either due to a view that nationalistic cross-class politics is in its interests, or potentially agreement with the opportunistic but not insignificant appeals to the working class. This is very clear even when looking at the seats in which Reform MPs were returned from the last Election. Places such as Ashfield, Boston and Skegness, Great Yarmouth etc. are all working class towns with formerly significant industries which have come to be classified as “left behind” by the political class. That Reform UK are winning in these areas reflects a fundamental weakness of the modern workers’ movement.

As for why these voters choose Reform, there is one dominant issue, namely immigration. In recent polling, 78% of Reform voters viewed immigration as being among their top 5 issues, with 59% referring to inflation / cost of living, 50% to the NHS and crime/anti-social behaviour, along with 43% mentioning “managing the economy”. Immigration and crime are unsurprising, given the significant emphasis on the two issues within Reform’s political offer, but it is also clear that on many of the fundamental issues that drive voters of all parties, in particular health and the economy, Reform are viewed as being a viable alternative to the increasingly unpopular established parties., again suggesting that this is also an issue of deeper political issues than immigration.

This is unsurprising. Fourteen years of Conservative government, which presided over vast cuts to public services and an economy that is still significantly weaker than it was prior to the 2008 financial crash, has been socially destructive, with the worst burden of this being placed on the working class. The series of desperate manoeuvres, from the initial referendum on membership of the European Union to the brief, disastrous attempt to forcibly “liberalise” the British economy by Liz Truss, have left the party viewed not just as vicious in their treatment of the most vulnerable in society, but increasingly incompetent in even carrying out those tasks. As a result, neither the working class, nor significant parts of the middle classes, or much of the capitalist class for that matter, have faith in the Tories.

Labour, even by the extremely low expectations set by themselves following their landslide victory in 2024, are proving to be hugely unpopular in government also. Attacks on the winter fuel allowance and the persistence of sluggish economic growth, amongst other issues, has had the effect of quickly restoring the hostility towards the party in many small working class towns, the areas in which Reform is mostly significantly gaining. This is a long-running problem, which can be traced back to the large concessions made by the Labour Party to the “neoliberal” economic consensus established on the back of the defeat of the workers’ movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Labour is perceived, correctly, as not representing the interests of the working class. Instead, it is viewed as being part of a “liberal elite”. The marginality of the socialist and communist left results in the opposition to these views coming from nationalistic populist politics of the right.

What is the communist response?

As communists, the response to the populist/far right must begin with a political response which is clear and unambiguous. First, in speaking to those workers who are considering voting for Reform, we have to be clear that Reform by and large is no different to the major parties which they seek to reject through a Reform vote. Reform is, whether you look at their wealthy backers, their very clear policy to undermine and erode away key public services that millions of British workers depend on, or their very paltry and clearly opportunistic “pro-worker” measures, a section of the British ruling class (or elite.) A UK governed by Reform would offer no more control to workers, and likely, through a planned bonfire of “red tape” mentioned in the manifesto, significantly more exploitative and insecure working conditions. And that is before getting into their opposition to the most rudimentary policies to address climate change.

However, to argue this alone is not sufficient. We also have to stress the communist approach as an alternative to the entire rotten capitalist order, rather than opposing Reform on a broad indistinct basis, which in the absence of an alternative perspective, appears as an argument for the disdained major political parties. In this sense, approaches often favoured by socialists, and the workers’ movement as a whole, leave a lot to be desired. The vague, indistinct political message of groups such as the Socialist Workers’ Party-dominated Stand Up To Racism, who have called for a “mass campaign calling out Reform’s racism, rejecting the government’s pandering to the scapegoating of migrants and refugees, and building unity against their division” is unfortunately an example of this method. While undoubtedly the baseline should be the condemnation of Reform, the inability to provide a clear alternative will scarcely seem plausible to those swayed by Farage and his party.

Along with this are the consistent appeals to an “anti-racist majority”, as the possibility of Reform winning over a significant section of the population in the next General Election only increases. As communists we should appeal first on the basis of our own politics and values, which includes but cannot be limited to just antiracism. The communist perspective is a tiny minority at present, in a society where two thirds of the population think immigration is too high. Talking solely about the mobilisation of an “anti-racist majority” ignores the scale of our task. There is undoubtedly a need for broad working class organisation against Reform and the rest of the far right, in providing a voice of opposition to their racist, reactionary ideas and protecting communities from the forces to the right of these parties that Reform will undoubtedly legitimise. Communists should, however, participate in such campaigns as communists, arguing that the rise of Reform is a reflection of a crisis of confidence in the ruling class. Further, it should be argued that this crisis of confidence can, by posing a viable alternative and organising a party around this alternative, be reflected in the growth of communist ideas and the eventual end of the entire capitalist system, rather than with the ultimately fantastical ideas of Reform.

A world of small businesses, “independent nation states” with little to no inwards migration, and other such ideas expressed in the political program of Reform, is unviable for any significant period of time, going against the dominant tendency of capital to centralise and conflict with the continued existence of the nation state. Even if it were viable, it would also have to be argued that a society of small petty enterprises would be of no benefit to the working class, likely worsening their conditions, along with the capacity for the productive forces in society to develop. Reform, along with this, offer even in their opportunistic turns towards policies such as the nationalisation of the steel industry, no serious sense of a world in which the working class have greater control over their lives.

The issues on which Reform, in the eyes of their voters, appears to stand out most from the rest of the ruling class must also be tackled openly by communists. While we have to expose Reform UK on issues such as the NHS, the parties’ funding sources and others, we cannot shy away from stating our position on issues like immigration and “law and order”, where Reform is gaining most. On the question of immigration, as has been discussed in a previous article, our position has to be unequivocal in our opposition to any and all controls on immigration, which imply a difference in the interests of the working class along national lines, and even in their tamer, less overt forms legitimise the ugliest forms of reactionary ideology. Immigrants are not the enemy, instead it is the capitalist class who pits native workers against foreign-born ones.

Similarly on crime, we have to oppose the idea that crimes are singular acts, divorced from the society in which they occur, with the only solution being greater and greater powers being granted for the state to police society. All crime, be it spontaneous and thoughtless or heavily organised, reflects something about society. The solution therefore is to identify the underlying issue which prompts criminality. In some cases this is very obvious. Most organised crime exists for much the same reason as a capitalist firm does, namely to profit. But even in crimes of passion, we can see expressions of wider problems within society, be it misogyny, racism, inadequate mental health support etc. The police force, rather than being there to protect us from criminals, is in reality the last line of defence, along with the armed forces, for the capitalist class. The alternative instead is the disbandment of the professionalised police force in favour of a democratised system of policing done by local communities.

We must be clear on what a communist government would seek to implement in other areas too, and how this is distinct from Reform:

• Where Reform proposes the use of private healthcare capacity to relieve pressure on the NHS (laying the ground for further privatisation), we argue for the socialisation of all the firms currently performing functions in the NHS, and the allocation of proper resources to healthcare as part of a democratic plan for society as a whole.
• Where Reform proposes huge cuts in taxation and regulations to preserve small businesses, we argue instead that workers and owners alike in small businesses will be freed by their business being socialised as part of an economic plan.
• Where Reform proposes opposition to pretty much all meaningful attempts to take action on climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, we argue instead for rapid action on climate change, aiming for decarbonisation as fast as possible, without the obstruction of the capitalist class.
• Where Reform suggests the retreat of Britain from many leading international institutions, we argue instead for these institutions to be replaced by organisations designed to facilitate the cooperation of the working class across borders.
• Where Reform talks about the need “to protect freedom of speech”, we actually oppose and seek to combat the main enemy of free expression and thought in society today, namely the capitalist class which controls the state and all of the media and publishing companies, a situation Reform, through the expansion of police powers, actually seeks to worsen.

Finally, there is a need for unity. Communists need to put ourselves in the best position possible to build a movement with a national presence. The areas in which Reform have grown most rapidly, by and large, exist far outside the scope of most communist work in Britain today. Where cities and student-dominated towns provide better areas for recruitment, there is a serious lack of socialist and communist politics in “left-behind” towns. This enables the populist right to present itself as the only alternative.

With a communist organisation of significant size, credibility and national strategy, the far right would be forced to contend with a political perspective that is opposed to the existing order, which seeks to represent the interests of the working class as a national and global force, aiming to gain control of their collective destiny. If this were done, I doubt many workers would prefer a perspective which offers to the working class the same exploitation and subjugation, but with a superficially anti-establishment coloration.